

A CESEE conundrum: low trust in government but high hopes for government-led job creation

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OeNB Euro Survey results for ten countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) from 2018 indicate that a major share of respondents is disappointed with public governance. Yet, while trust in national governments is lacking, there is still a widespread belief that creating jobs is primarily a state responsibility, even 30 years after the onset of transition. As shown by a series of probit regressions, respondents are more likely to consider job creation to be above all a state responsibility if they belong to a low-income household, have comparatively little wealth and comparatively little education, rely on welfare payments, have worked for the public sector or reside outside the capital city. The views of respondents who express a lack of trust in government are also colored strongly by past economic hardship experiences. While there is, of course, a limit to how big the welfare state can get, our survey results imply that there is a case for national governments to build up buffers to be able to tide people over when incomes dry up in crisis episodes, and to invest more in developing human capital and improving social inclusion to address the concerns of marginalized societal groups.

JEL classification: A13, H11, P35

Keywords: public preferences, trust in government, government-led job creation, survey data, CESEE

People's attitudes toward public governance, the quality of public institutions and the role of the state in the economy are only rarely explored using survey data compiled across a variety of countries. Yet, comparable survey data allow us to study where, how and why attitudes vary across countries, thus enabling us to explain cross-country variations (see, for instance, Denisova et al., 2009; or Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005). For countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE), such data are indeed available from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), jointly undertaken by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. And such data have also been made available through a 2018 wave of the OeNB Euro Survey,² which included a number of questions aimed at capturing individual attitudes toward public governance (building on Hayo and Neumeier, 2019; and Stix, 2013) and about the role the state should play in the economy (similarly to the first LiTS wave; see EBRD, 2006). Corroborating LiTS results, the OeNB Euro Survey results show that a major share of

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² Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank. OeNB Euro Survey. www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/Surveys/OeNB-Euro-Survey.html. Sample: 1,000 people per country, aged 15 and over, in the following ten CESEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Serbia.

respondents in the ten investigated CESEE countries are concerned about different dimensions of public governance and distrustful of government. At the same time, they still expect the government to play a large role in the economy and soften the effects of market fluctuations, even 30 years after the onset of transition.³

This short study provides the relevant stylized facts (section 1) and sheds light on the characteristics of individuals expressing such views (section 2). With that we try to understand better the origins of subjective attitudes toward politics in the CESEE region. On the back of a large body of political science literature that provided evidence for public attitudes impacting public policy (e.g. Burstein, 2003; Hager and Hilbig, 2020; Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005; Manza et al., 2002), this knowledge should be useful for the design of targeted policies that enhance people's trust in, and support for, the respective institutional frameworks – not in the sense that people are manipulated for this purpose, but in the sense that their respective socioeconomic conditions are adequately accounted for. This could ultimately allow for more stable political and economic outcomes in the region (EBRD, 2019; IMF, 2016).

1 Distrusting government but counting on government for job creation – stylized facts

To uncover people's attitudes toward public governance, we initially investigate four different dimensions of how people perceive the behavior of politicians or the government/the state in their respective countries: (1) *distrust* in government, (2) *vested interests* (i.e. the perception that most politicians just serve the interests of particular groups rather than the interest of the general public), (3) *short-term rent-seeking* (i.e. the perception that most politicians are more concerned about the next elections than about the country's long-term well-being), and (4) *poor tax revenue-managing capacities* (i.e. the perception that the state is wasting taxpayer money rather than managing tax revenues conscientiously).⁴ See chart 1 (upper panel) for a quick summary of the respective answers, indicating that public perception of public governance is clearly dominated by skeptical views. On average across the ten CESEE countries, between 65% and 70% of respondents raised concerns about vested interests, short-term rent-seeking or a poor tax revenue-managing capacity. Distrust in government is also significant, with about 45% of respondents indicating that they do not trust their government.⁵ Even though skeptical views on public governance are widespread across all ten CESEE countries surveyed, they are particularly pronounced in the Southeastern European (SEE)

³ Note that these results and the conclusions drawn from them are based on the 2018 fall wave of the OeNB Euro Survey. More recently, we have been witnessing national governments around the world taking a more active role in taming crises induced by market fluctuations amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Future survey waves may be expected to reveal the imprint the current crisis is going to leave on people's attitudes.

⁴ For detailed definitions of the variables, see table A1 in the annex.

⁵ It should be noted that according to data from the Gallup World Poll, respondents in CESEE countries are less trustful of their governments than respondents in economies of comparable income elsewhere (EBRD, 2019). Based on the third wave of LiTS (EBRD, 2016), only about two-fifths of respondents, in a broader set of CESEE countries than analyzed here, have confidence in their national governments. The OeNB Euro Survey time series on trust in government starts in 2009 (see chart A2 in the annex). Over the last decade, trust has increased significantly in Albania, Hungary, Poland and Serbia, while it has decreased significantly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czechia (until 2012) and North Macedonia. In Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, it has remained broadly unchanged at a comparatively low level.


EU Member States⁶ as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. This negative perception of public governance might be surprising in view of 30 years of experience with implementing democratic structures and the fact that the countries were not suffering a notable crisis at the time the survey was conducted. Yet, the negative perception ties in with reports of international organizations that have raised concerns about still comparatively unfavorable levels of quality of institutions, governance and corruption in the region (e.g. EBRD, 2019; ECB, 2020; IMF, 2016).

Chart 1

Low trust in government but high hopes for government-led job creation


Public perception of public governance dominated by skeptical views

% of respondents who agree with the statements below



Widespread belief that creating jobs is primarily a state responsibility

% of respondents



Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2018.


Note: Weighted percentages excluding respondents with "don't know" answers or who refused to answer. Weights are calibrated on census population statistics for age, gender, region and, where available, on education and ethnicity (separately for each country). Entries for CESEE are unconditional averages across all observations using individual weights not adjusted for population size.

⁶ The SEE EU Member States comprise Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Respondents in Romania express the strongest distrust in our sample, amid mass anti-government protests that started in 2017 and continued in 2018 on the back of relaxed anti-corruption laws.

Chart 2

Comparison with Corruption Perception Index

% of respondents agreeing with the statement "most politicians only serve the interests of particular groups"



Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2018, Transparency International.

Note: OeNB Euro Survey data are weighted; excluding respondents with "don't know" answers or who refused to answer.

Consistency between the scores of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International in 2018 and the OeNB Euro Survey responses on vested interests confirms the validity of our survey data (see chart 2). Countries with lower CPI scores (indicating higher corruption) coincide with higher shares of agreement that politicians of the respective country only serve vested interests. Albania, Hungary and Serbia seem to be an exception; their respondents less frequently report a prevalence of vested interests than countries with a similar CPI score.

In a second step, the survey asked respondents whether job creation should primarily be a state responsibility or a private sector responsibility (or a shared responsibility; for detailed country-specific answers, see also chart A1 in the annex). Despite the underlying concerns about public governance, demand for state intervention in the economy is nonetheless very substantial, with about

45% of respondents in the full sample arguing that job creation should *primarily* be a responsibility of the state (see lower panel in chart 1). Support for this role is largest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia with shares of about 60%, followed by Albania and Romania with shares of about 53%. The overall share of respondents who do *not* trust government *but* primarily look to the state for job creation (blue bars in the lower panel of chart 1) is about 20% in the full sample, with Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia showing the largest shares (around 30%). Even though the share of respondents thus holding seemingly contradictory beliefs is, at first glance, not extraordinarily high, it should be emphasized that respondents who express distrust in government often make up a significant share of those who expect jobs to be created above all by government (e.g. more than half in the SEE EU Member States and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Existing literature points to a paradoxical relationship between distrust in public institutions and demand for more state regulation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2010), where the main trigger comes from private businesses imposing negative externalities on society in an environment with poor social capital and the society apparently choosing to demand more state regulation and tolerating occasional corruption to reduce these externalities. However, based on our sample we cannot confirm a statistically significant conditional correlation between respondents' demand for government-led job creation and distrust in government (unlike Denisova et al., 2010, for Russia). In any case, respondents holding both beliefs are characterized by a mixed socioeconomic profile that differs from other groups in the sample (see the next section).

2 Who are the people that do not trust government but look to the state for job creation first?

To explore these issues further, we examine whether respondents' political attitudes are shaped by their individual socioeconomic background (in line with, for instance, Pitlik et al., 2011). We run a series of probit estimations with country-fixed effects and robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the regional level. We run regressions on six dependent variables: on the four variables of perceived public governance, on the variable representing job creation as primarily a state responsibility and on the dummy indicating the subgroup of respondents who distrust government but look to the government for job creation first. In all six regressions, we control for the same socioeconomic, sociodemographic and household characteristics. For a detailed list of all variables and their definitions, see table A1 in the annex.⁷

Selected marginal effects are reported in chart 3 for the full sample, while the complete set of regression results – also emphasizing differences between country groups – is shown in table A2 in the annex.⁸ We find that distrust in government (upper left-hand panel in chart 3) and the perception of vested interests (upper right-hand panel), short-term rent-seeking behavior (middle left-hand panel) and the waste of taxpayer money (middle right-hand panel) are very robustly associated with economic hardship undergone in the recent past: Respondents who had to cut back on basic consumption for some time in the period from 2008 to 2018 are more likely to have very skeptical views of public governance. Conversely, receipt of social transfers has a mitigating effect on all four dependent variables: Respondents who received unemployment benefits for some time in the period from 2008 to 2018 are less likely to voice concerns about politicians' behavior, and respondents for whom welfare benefits are an important source of income are less likely to voice concerns about vested interests and waste of taxpayer money. Moreover, ownership of assets – in the form of a secondary residence or other real estate in addition to a main residence – is associated with less pronounced distrust and skepticism. Interestingly, other economically important variables such as educational attainment, employment status (except for self-employment) or net household income do not appear to matter in this context.⁹ In addition, and as expected, respondents who would vote for a ruling political party, who are interested in politics or who report a high degree of life satisfaction are significantly less skeptical about public governance. Furthermore, respondents' attitudes vary systematically with age, gender and religion (see table A2). The qualitatively

⁷ Results shown in this section are robust with regard to alternative specifications of standard errors (e.g. adjusted for clustering at the level of primary sampling units, instead of regions, or the use of Huber-White standard errors) and alternative definitions of explanatory variables (e.g. using a variable eliciting ideological preferences for left-wing, centrist or right-wing parties instead of the preference for a ruling party). The respective results are available upon request.

⁸ In addition to the full sample, we performed probit regressions on three different groups of countries: the CEE EU members Czechia, Hungary and Poland; the SEE EU members Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania; and the EU candidates and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia.


⁹ However, Belabed and Hake (2018) show in a multi-level regression analysis that people are more likely to trust their national institutions if regional and country-level income inequality is low (particularly in EU candidates and potential candidates), if they earn comparatively more or if their relative income position is higher, and if the perceived levels of corruption are low and the rule of law is strong.

similar results do not come as a surprise, given that these four variables capture similar dimensions of people’s attitudes toward public governance.

Our findings for the respondents who see job creation primarily as a state responsibility are quite different (lower left-hand panel in chart 3): in this case, responses show more differentiation in line with individuals’ current economic situation – economic “fundamentals” matter much more. Those who are better off or less marginalized (i.e. those who have a higher level of education, belong to the

Chart 3

Socioeconomic factors associated with skeptical views about public governance and distrust in government in CESEE countries



Source: Authors’ calculation based on OeNB Euro Survey wave 2018.

Note: Columns represent average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The eight explanatory variables enter as dummy variables. Additional dummy variables control for age, gender, party preference, employment status, religion, interest in politics, life satisfaction, housing condition relative to neighboring homes, prevalence of savings and household size (not shown). The results refer to the full set of data available for the ten surveyed CESEE countries, i.e. columns (1), (5), (9), (13), (17) and (21) in table A2.

upper income tercile, hold more assets – either in the form of a secondary residence or more savings –, have to rely less on public welfare benefits or live in the capital city) are less likely to look to the state for job creation first. The aggregate picture presented in chart 3 conceals some interesting cross-regional heterogeneity. For instance, as can be seen in table A2, being better off in terms of higher household income or owning a secondary residence makes respondents less likely to expect government-led job creation only in the three CEE EU Member States. Moreover, the regressions explaining preferences for looking to the state for job creation first are the only ones where no explanatory variable is statistically significant across all the three country groups, pointing to stronger cross-country differences in this case.

Finally, when focusing on the last dependent variable capturing respondents who hold both seemingly contradictory beliefs, i.e. express distrust in the government *and* expect governments to take the initiative in providing jobs (lower right-hand panel in chart 3), it becomes evident that they share a mixture of characteristics: in addition to the socioeconomic factors that were already important for respondents who voiced distrust in government, marginalization effects play an important role as well. In particular, respondents are more likely to support both beliefs if they have experienced economic hardship, have not received unemployment benefits, have a low level of household income, do not have a secondary residence or live outside the capital city.

3 Key takeaways: adequate institution-building and social inclusion matter

While respondents are more likely to express trust in government if they are cushioned from economic hardship, have benefited from social transfers or hold safe assets, it is a serious policy challenge for all CESEE governments to run the state effectively and meet people's expectations. A more extensive welfare state may be hampered by limited spending capacities and fiscal space, especially over the longer run. Consequently, it would be important for politicians to develop, realize and appropriately communicate a long-term strategy that takes into account limited social transfer possibilities, tries to avoid catering to vested interests and makes an effort to ensure the build-up of buffers enabling the state to tide people over crisis periods.

Social inclusion also plays an important role according to our results. Those who are less marginalized (i.e. those who have comparatively higher levels of education, belong to the upper income tercile, possess comparatively more assets, do not rely heavily on public welfare benefits or live in the capital city) do not see job creation primarily as a state responsibility. Rather than expecting the state to intervene strongly in the job market to address the concerns of marginalized societal groups, which could be very expensive and would add to fiscal constraints, these respondents support a more active role for the state in investing in human capital and improving social inclusion by enhancing (access to) education and making targeted social transfers to the poor. The funds to pay for that will most likely have to come from longer-term-oriented budget policies.

However, given that populists, of both right- and left-wing varieties, could take advantage of distrust of government and people's worries about market turmoil fallout, there is a danger that short-term rent-seeking behavior gains further prev-

alence. One answer to these challenges consists in adequate institution-building. Sound institutions are crucial for providing the analytical capacities for policy design and implementation and promoting a conscientious and prudent management of tax revenues. Independent audit offices and fiscal councils that recently have been set up in several CESEE countries (or whose establishment has been debated) could prove to play essential roles in achieving these objectives and thus fostering trust and promoting satisfaction with public governance (OECD, 2017).¹⁰ Moreover, appropriate fiscal rules could be helpful in bringing reelection-minded incumbents away from a solely short-run, election-oriented budget policy behavior¹¹ to a longer-run, growth-promoting orientation (Rose, 2006).

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¹⁰ *In an environment of entrenched and long-lasting distrust in the government, building trusted institutions needs strong commitments. For instance, the analysis of Begovic et al. (2016) based on OeNB Euro Survey data suggests that currency board arrangements are more likely to increase the credibility of the monetary authority in countries with a low level of trust in the government and a weak economy.*

¹¹ *“The government chooses economic policies during its incumbency which maximize its plurality at the next election” (Nordhaus, 1975, p. 174). Most likely, the related fiscal expansion before an election, followed by a tightening after the election, affects the real business cycle of a country in an asymmetric shock-type manner. The political economy literature has summarized this view as the “political business cycle.” Brender and Drazen (2005) showed that political business cycles had been especially prevalent in new democracies such as the CESEE countries.*

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Annex

Table A1

Variable description

| Label | Description |
|--|--|
| <i>(1) Perceptions of public governance (dependent variables in the regressions)</i> | |
| Distrust in government | Dummy equals 1 if respondents reported to somewhat or completely distrust the central government/cabinet of ministers; 0 if they indicated complete/some trust or picked neither trust nor distrust (5-point Likert scale). |
| Vested interests | Dummy equals 1 if respondents rather/strongly agreed with the statement "most politicians in my country serve the interests of particular groups"; 0 if they rather/strongly agreed with the statement "most politicians in my country act in line with the general public's interest" or if they indicated no preference or considered both statements to be somewhat true. |
| Short-term rent-seeking | Dummy equals 1 if respondents rather/strongly agreed with the statement "most politicians in my country are concerned about the next elections"; 0 if they rather/strongly agreed with the statement "most politicians in my country are concerned about the country's long-term well-being" or if they indicated no preference or considered both statements to be somewhat true. |
| Waste of taxpayer money | Dummy equals 1 if respondents rather/strongly agreed with the statement "the state is wasting taxpayer money"; 0 if they rather/strongly agreed with the statement "the state manages tax revenues conscientiously" or if they indicated no preference or considered both statements to be somewhat true. |
| Government-led job creation | Dummy equals 1 if respondents considered the state to be primarily responsible for creating jobs; 0 if they considered job creation to be primarily a private sector responsibility or a shared public/private responsibility, or said that it did not matter as long as jobs were available. |
| Distrust in government and expectations of government-led job creation | Dummy equals 1 if the dummy "distrust in government" equals 1 AND the dummy "government-led job creation" equals 1 for a given respondent; 0 otherwise. |
| <i>(2) Socioeconomic characteristics</i> | |
| Cut back on consumption | Dummy equals 1 if respondents had to cut back on basic consumption in the period from 2008 to 2018; 0 otherwise. |
| Unemployment benefits | Dummy equals 1 if respondents received unemployment benefits in the period from 2008 to 2018; 0 otherwise. |
| Welfare benefits | Dummy equals 1 if respondents considered public welfare benefits to be very/rather important for their individual (or shared) budgets at the time of asking (with welfare benefits including unemployment compensation, public pension, benefits for families and children, etc.); 0 if they indicated that such benefits were not important or not part of household income. |
| Wage cut | Dummy equals 1 if respondents had to accept wage cuts or delayed wage payments in the period from 2008 to 2018; 0 otherwise. |
| Employment status | Dummy variables: self-employed, unemployed, retired, student. Base category: employed. |
| Worked for the public sector | Dummy equals 1 if respondents worked for the public sector and received a wage income in the period from 2008 to 2018; 0 otherwise. |
| Secondary residence | Dummy equals 1 if respondents confirmed that they or a household member owned a secondary residence or other real estate (beyond the main residence); 0 if they said that this was not the case, refused to answer or were not able to provide an answer. |
| Savings | Dummy equals 1 if respondents reported to have savings; 0 otherwise. |
| House in poorer/better condition | Dummy variables take value 1 if interviewers considered a given dwelling to be in a better or poorer condition than the neighboring dwellings. Base category: similar condition. |
| <i>(3) Sociodemographic characteristics</i> | |
| Age | Dummy variables for three age groups: 19 to 34 years, 35 to 54 years (base category) and 55 and more years. |
| Female | Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if respondents were female, 0 otherwise (base category). |
| Educational attainment | Dummy variables; degree of educational attainment (high, medium, low). Base category: low level of education. |
| Religion | Dummy variables: Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Catholic Christian, Protestant Christian (and other Christian faith), other faith groups (e.g. Jewish, Buddhist), no answer. Base category: atheist/agnostic. |
| Interest in politics | Dummy equals 1 if respondents rather/strongly agreed with the statement "I am very interested in politics"; 0 otherwise. |
| Life satisfaction | Dummy equals 1 if respondents rather/strongly agreed with the statement "all things considered, I am satisfied with my life now"; 0 otherwise. |
| Party preference | Respondents were asked which party they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held during the coming week. Dummy variables: would vote for a ruling party, would not vote, were undecided or refused to answer. Base category: opposition party. |
| <i>(4) Household characteristics</i> | |
| Income | Dummy variables for the level of total household income after taxes (high, medium, don't know/no answer). Base category: low income. |
| Household size | Dummy variables for the number of persons living permanently in a given household (two, three and more individuals). Base category: single person. |
| Capital city resident | Dummy equals 1 if respondents' main residence is in the capital city; 0 otherwise. |

Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: Unless otherwise stated, respondents with "don't know" answers or who refused to answer are excluded.

Probit regression results

Table A2

Probit estimations: distrust in government and public perception of public governance; in CESEE and per country group

| | Distrust in government | | | | Most politicians only serve vested interests | | | |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/ PL | BG/HR/ RO | AL/BA/ MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/ PL | BG/HR/ RO | AL/BA/ MK/RS |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Experienced wage cuts (2008-2018) | 0.016 (0.024) | -0.040 (0.033) | 0.040 (0.056) | 0.025 (0.034) | -0.003 (0.019) | -0.013 (0.038) | -0.024 (0.026) | 0.019 (0.035) |
| Had to cut back on consumption (2008-2018) | 0.079*** (0.016) | 0.085*** (0.027) | 0.090*** (0.025) | 0.066** (0.026) | 0.117*** (0.015) | 0.136*** (0.027) | 0.095*** (0.019) | 0.120*** (0.031) |
| Public welfare benefits are currently important | -0.019 (0.020) | -0.038 (0.027) | 0.011 (0.034) | -0.022 (0.029) | -0.045** (0.019) | -0.092*** (0.027) | 0.015 (0.029) | -0.063** (0.028) |
| Received unemployment benefits (2008-2018) | -0.055*** (0.020) | -0.001 (0.034) | -0.062* (0.036) | -0.069** (0.035) | -0.041** (0.019) | -0.037 (0.032) | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.049 (0.035) |
| Public sector work experience (2008-2018) | -0.012 (0.020) | 0.011 (0.022) | -0.027 (0.030) | -0.022 (0.048) | -0.009 (0.018) | 0.031 (0.030) | -0.036 (0.026) | -0.028 (0.026) |
| Would vote for a ruling party | -0.287*** (0.025) | -0.298*** (0.039) | -0.286*** (0.041) | -0.272*** (0.046) | -0.136*** (0.020) | -0.152*** (0.034) | -0.084*** (0.027) | -0.169*** (0.035) |
| Would not vote | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.035 (0.040) | 0.037 (0.029) | -0.031 (0.044) | 0.046** (0.022) | 0.084** (0.041) | 0.047** (0.021) | 0.015 (0.047) |
| Don't know for whom to vote | -0.079*** (0.029) | -0.095* (0.052) | -0.056 (0.041) | -0.088 (0.056) | 0.043 (0.027) | 0.047 (0.039) | 0.041 (0.034) | 0.012 (0.044) |
| Refused to reveal voting preference | -0.124*** (0.030) | -0.051 (0.057) | -0.077 (0.048) | -0.176*** (0.052) | 0.003 (0.031) | -0.005 (0.049) | 0.038 (0.044) | -0.036 (0.052) |
| Aged 19 to 34 years | 0.025 (0.016) | -0.027 (0.023) | 0.042 (0.028) | 0.050* (0.028) | -0.026** (0.013) | -0.051*** (0.018) | -0.010 (0.023) | -0.025 (0.024) |
| Aged 55+ years | 0.002 (0.017) | -0.049** (0.023) | 0.029 (0.027) | 0.032 (0.027) | 0.038** (0.015) | 0.042 (0.029) | -0.005 (0.025) | 0.065*** (0.022) |
| Female | -0.008 (0.010) | -0.014 (0.017) | -0.006 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.013) | -0.031*** (0.011) | -0.022 (0.023) | -0.030*** (0.011) | -0.038* (0.023) |
| Educational attainment: high | 0.019 (0.029) | 0.044 (0.045) | 0.101* (0.056) | -0.034 (0.05) | -0.023 (0.027) | 0.013 (0.047) | -0.022 (0.039) | -0.052 (0.045) |
| Educational attainment: medium | 0.023 (0.023) | 0.042 (0.039) | 0.100* (0.054) | -0.013 (0.034) | -0.023 (0.019) | 0.017 (0.039) | -0.045 (0.041) | -0.028 (0.027) |
| Self-employed | -0.051** (0.020) | -0.005 (0.031) | -0.071** (0.032) | -0.102*** (0.034) | 0.018 (0.023) | 0.039 (0.040) | -0.023 (0.035) | 0.015 (0.033) |
| Unemployed | -0.006 (0.020) | -0.009 (0.042) | -0.015 (0.032) | -0.012 (0.028) | 0.009 (0.023) | 0.028 (0.043) | -0.072** (0.031) | 0.035 (0.029) |
| Retired | -0.015 (0.022) | 0.057* (0.032) | -0.037 (0.035) | -0.057* (0.034) | -0.004 (0.023) | 0.049 (0.040) | -0.026 (0.034) | -0.029 (0.038) |
| Student | -0.052** (0.023) | -0.006 (0.041) | -0.049 (0.044) | -0.090*** (0.032) | 0.005 (0.027) | 0.014 (0.049) | -0.017 (0.040) | 0.021 (0.049) |
| Muslim | -0.009 (0.051) | 0.000 (.) | 0.037 (0.058) | -0.350*** (0.073) | 0.048 (0.052) | 0.000 (.) | 0.082 (0.059) | 0.050 (0.059) |
| Orthodox Christian | -0.039 (0.042) | -0.014 (0.079) | 0.031 (0.058) | -0.374*** (0.075) | 0.058 (0.066) | -0.048 (0.083) | 0.055 (0.061) | 0.040 (0.063) |
| Catholic Christian | -0.066** (0.026) | -0.055** (0.022) | 0.031 (0.052) | -0.500*** (0.073) | 0.001 (0.026) | 0.038 (0.024) | -0.175** (0.076) | 0.060 (0.091) |
| Other Christian faith (e.g. Protestant) | -0.057* (0.034) | -0.109*** (0.030) | 0.130* (0.078) | -0.294*** (0.099) | -0.019 (0.037) | -0.042 (0.040) | -0.005 (0.069) | 0.111 (0.088) |

Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. P(DepVar=1) denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Table A2 continued

Probit estimations: distrust in government and public perception of public governance; in CESEE and per country group

| | Distrust in government | | | | Most politicians only serve vested interests | | | |
|--|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/ PL | BG/HR/ RO | AL/BA/ MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/ PL | BG/HR/ RO | AL/BA/ MK/RS |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Other faith groups (e.g. Jewish, Buddhist) | -0.012 (0.075) | 0.033 (0.102) | -0.158* (0.084) | -0.064 (0.1) | -0.037 (0.083) | -0.013 (0.144) | -0.105 (0.144) | 0.003 (0.196) |
| Religion: no answer | -0.023 (0.048) | -0.042 (0.041) | -0.047 (0.094) | -0.161 (0.146) | -0.024 (0.042) | -0.062 (0.059) | 0.076* (0.043) | -0.081 (0.133) |
| Very interested in politics | -0.034** (0.015) | 0.011 (0.029) | -0.015 (0.028) | -0.075*** (0.018) | -0.047*** (0.018) | -0.074*** (0.025) | -0.011 (0.021) | -0.059* (0.032) |
| Satisfied with life as it is | -0.136*** (0.017) | -0.130*** (0.024) | -0.131*** (0.032) | -0.137*** (0.027) | -0.014 (0.016) | -0.001 (0.024) | 0.011 (0.025) | -0.037 (0.026) |
| House in better condition than that of neighbors | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.021 (0.026) | 0.013 (0.027) | 0.015 (0.016) | -0.021 (0.015) | -0.055** (0.022) | 0.001 (0.025) | -0.015 (0.025) |
| House in poorer condition than that of neighbors | 0.041* (0.022) | 0.031 (0.029) | 0.009 (0.043) | 0.056 (0.038) | -0.005 (0.018) | -0.034 (0.039) | -0.006 (0.024) | 0.022 (0.023) |
| Has secondary residence or other real estate | -0.038*** (0.014) | -0.062** (0.025) | -0.044* (0.025) | -0.017 (0.02) | -0.034** (0.016) | -0.087*** (0.023) | -0.022 (0.026) | -0.007 (0.022) |
| Respondent reports savings | -0.016 (0.017) | -0.025 (0.019) | -0.032 (0.032) | 0.003 (0.029) | -0.005 (0.017) | -0.003 (0.032) | -0.051* (0.028) | 0.043** (0.021) |
| Don't know/no answer on savings | -0.031 (0.037) | -0.123*** (0.042) | 0.000 (0.058) | 0.011 (0.089) | -0.051 (0.039) | -0.058 (0.060) | -0.042 (0.061) | -0.044 (0.053) |
| Capital city resident | -0.016 (0.035) | -0.165*** (0.027) | 0.076** (0.032) | 0.004 (0.044) | -0.045** (0.018) | -0.107*** (0.031) | 0.008 (0.024) | -0.066*** (0.023) |
| High income | 0.021 (0.019) | -0.011 (0.037) | 0.027 (0.032) | 0.026 (0.026) | 0.014 (0.022) | 0.029 (0.041) | -0.039 (0.029) | 0.059* (0.032) |
| Medium income | 0.025 (0.016) | -0.032 (0.027) | 0.039 (0.033) | 0.054** (0.023) | -0.004 (0.016) | -0.016 (0.024) | 0.000 (0.023) | 0.002 (0.032) |
| Don't know/no answer on income | 0.050*** (0.019) | 0.073** (0.034) | 0.005 (0.032) | 0.061** (0.03) | -0.007 (0.030) | 0.067* (0.038) | -0.082** (0.042) | 0.027 (0.037) |
| 2-person household | 0.005 (0.022) | 0.036 (0.035) | 0.014 (0.037) | -0.024 (0.036) | 0.010 (0.019) | 0.017 (0.037) | 0.006 (0.029) | -0.001 (0.034) |
| 3-plus-person household | -0.018 (0.024) | -0.004 (0.043) | 0.005 (0.040) | -0.035 (0.035) | 0.027 (0.021) | 0.005 (0.036) | 0.016 (0.032) | 0.048 (0.039) |
| Country-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Log likelihood | -5,104.0 | -1,516.5 | -1,580.1 | -1,902.1 | -4,625.5 | -1,670.0 | -1,116.7 | -1,732.5 |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.11 |
| Prob > Chi squared | 1,205.7 | .. | .. | .. | 2,027.3 | .. | .. | .. |
| Number of observations | 8,777 | 2,667 | 2,702 | 3,404 | 8,411 | 2,656 | 2,619 | 3,132 |
| P(DepVar=1) | 0.45 | 0.36 | 0.64 | 0.38 | 0.70 | 0.60 | 0.82 | 0.69 |

Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. P(DepVar=1) denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Table A2 continued

Probit estimations: public perception of public governance; in CESEE and per country group

| | Most politicians are just concerned about the next elections | | | | The state is wasting taxpayer money | | | |
|---|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS |
| | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Experienced wage cuts (2008-2018) | -0.010 (0.018) | -0.046 (0.032) | -0.016 (0.027) | 0.008 (0.028) | 0.044*** (0.016) | 0.024 (0.030) | 0.014 (0.030) | 0.078*** (0.028) |
| Had to cut back on consumption (2008-2018) | 0.105*** (0.017) | 0.132*** (0.026) | 0.067** (0.028) | 0.116*** (0.030) | 0.080*** (0.017) | 0.094*** (0.032) | 0.067** (0.028) | 0.077** (0.031) |
| Public welfare benefits are currently important | -0.053*** (0.019) | -0.084*** (0.024) | 0.021 (0.026) | -0.097*** (0.030) | -0.031* (0.019) | -0.051* (0.027) | 0.015 (0.032) | -0.061** (0.027) |
| Received unemployment benefits (2008-2018) | -0.019 (0.020) | 0.015 (0.035) | 0.007 (0.024) | -0.041 (0.032) | -0.048** (0.020) | -0.028 (0.034) | -0.034 (0.028) | -0.033 (0.037) |
| Public sector work experience (2008-2018) | 0.000 (0.016) | 0.016 (0.025) | -0.009 (0.027) | -0.010 (0.026) | -0.003 (0.015) | 0.047* (0.025) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.046** (0.022) |
| Would vote for a ruling party | -0.142*** (0.024) | -0.134*** (0.036) | -0.085** (0.034) | -0.202*** (0.039) | -0.181*** (0.022) | -0.237*** (0.036) | -0.083*** (0.028) | -0.220*** (0.040) |
| Would not vote | 0.027 (0.020) | -0.009 (0.031) | 0.069*** (0.024) | -0.005 (0.041) | 0.022 (0.023) | 0.052 (0.042) | 0.054** (0.024) | -0.027 (0.045) |
| Don't know for whom to vote | 0.047* (0.024) | -0.007 (0.032) | 0.098*** (0.031) | 0.002 (0.045) | 0.016 (0.028) | -0.023 (0.040) | 0.064 (0.041) | -0.039 (0.041) |
| Refused to reveal voting preference | -0.009 (0.030) | -0.031 (0.049) | 0.073 (0.044) | -0.072* (0.042) | -0.013 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.045) | 0.065 (0.044) | -0.091** (0.045) |
| Aged 19 to 34 years | -0.020 (0.013) | -0.037* (0.021) | -0.015 (0.020) | -0.007 (0.022) | -0.028** (0.013) | -0.080*** (0.024) | -0.007 (0.020) | -0.006 (0.018) |
| Aged 55+ years | 0.018 (0.015) | 0.065** (0.028) | -0.003 (0.026) | -0.003 (0.024) | 0.002 (0.021) | -0.007 (0.044) | -0.046* (0.026) | 0.048 (0.032) |
| Female | -0.026*** (0.010) | -0.005 (0.020) | -0.037*** (0.011) | -0.037* (0.020) | -0.013 (0.010) | 0.009 (0.017) | -0.011 (0.013) | -0.030 (0.021) |
| Education attainment: high | -0.022 (0.028) | 0.022 (0.049) | -0.047 (0.037) | -0.051 (0.049) | -0.011 (0.025) | 0.060 (0.043) | -0.069* (0.039) | -0.025 (0.034) |
| Education attainment: medium | -0.037* (0.019) | 0.009 (0.039) | -0.072** (0.036) | -0.050 (0.030) | -0.008 (0.019) | 0.063* (0.036) | -0.054 (0.036) | -0.027 (0.025) |
| Self-employed | 0.042** (0.021) | 0.094** (0.037) | -0.010 (0.027) | 0.011 (0.032) | 0.023 (0.022) | 0.023 (0.039) | -0.027 (0.026) | 0.069* (0.037) |
| Unemployed | -0.005 (0.021) | -0.012 (0.048) | -0.037 (0.026) | 0.008 (0.032) | -0.008 (0.020) | -0.044 (0.046) | -0.060* (0.032) | 0.014 (0.027) |
| Retired | -0.002 (0.021) | -0.002 (0.040) | -0.024 (0.025) | 0.005 (0.034) | 0.013 (0.024) | 0.088** (0.044) | -0.008 (0.036) | -0.035 (0.037) |
| Student | -0.006 (0.028) | 0.020 (0.047) | -0.030 (0.039) | -0.012 (0.048) | 0.009 (0.030) | 0.020 (0.040) | -0.008 (0.052) | 0.008 (0.049) |
| Muslim | -0.012 (0.051) | -0.341* (0.197) | 0.039 (0.074) | -0.101* (0.058) | -0.002 (0.054) | 0.000 (.) | -0.021 (0.069) | 0.082 (0.080) |
| Orthodox Christian | 0.038 (0.064) | -0.053 (0.081) | 0.065 (0.068) | -0.066 (0.058) | 0.017 (0.069) | -0.103 (0.092) | 0.031 (0.070) | 0.078 (0.093) |
| Catholic Christian | -0.016 (0.023) | 0.010 (0.022) | -0.122 (0.077) | -0.066 (0.084) | -0.035 (0.027) | -0.023 (0.030) | -0.172* (0.095) | 0.087 (0.089) |
| Other Christian faith (e.g. Protestant) | -0.035 (0.035) | -0.079* (0.041) | -0.032 (0.076) | 0.081 (0.065) | -0.024 (0.036) | -0.069* (0.041) | -0.066 (0.096) | 0.221** (0.110) |

Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. $P(\text{DepVar}=1)$ denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Table A2 continued

Probit estimations: public perception of public governance; in CESEE and per country group

| | Most politicians are just concerned about the next elections | | | | The state is wasting taxpayer money | | | |
|--|--|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS |
| | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Other faith groups (e.g. Jewish, Buddhist) | -0.101 (0.096) | -0.146 (0.144) | -0.006 (0.158) | -0.309** (0.146) | -0.152 (0.094) | -0.203 (0.132) | -0.163 (0.184) | -0.033 (0.186) |
| Religion: no answer | -0.075* (0.043) | -0.121** (0.058) | 0.021 (0.051) | -0.114 (0.106) | -0.039 (0.047) | -0.119* (0.071) | -0.011 (0.046) | 0.208 (0.155) |
| Very interested in politics | -0.054** (0.022) | -0.074** (0.031) | -0.020 (0.020) | -0.072* (0.041) | -0.044** (0.020) | -0.070** (0.030) | 0.008 (0.028) | -0.071** (0.031) |
| Satisfied with life as it is | -0.022 (0.020) | -0.024 (0.031) | 0.021 (0.029) | -0.054 (0.034) | -0.037** (0.018) | -0.016 (0.024) | -0.004 (0.031) | -0.079*** (0.030) |
| House in better condition than that of neighbors | -0.022 (0.014) | -0.052** (0.024) | -0.031 (0.020) | 0.004 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.015) | -0.009 (0.025) | -0.008 (0.025) | 0.005 (0.021) |
| House in poorer condition than that of neighbors | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.040 (0.032) | -0.015 (0.026) | 0.042 (0.042) | -0.003 (0.020) | 0.013 (0.027) | -0.028 (0.037) | 0.006 (0.028) |
| Has secondary residence or other real estate | -0.036** (0.015) | -0.067** (0.026) | -0.031 (0.023) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.033** (0.015) | -0.059*** (0.021) | -0.032 (0.032) | -0.016 (0.022) |
| Respondent reports savings | -0.020 (0.015) | -0.007 (0.022) | -0.042 (0.028) | -0.013 (0.021) | -0.002 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.028) | -0.031 (0.021) | 0.015 (0.023) |
| Don't know/no answer on savings | -0.049 (0.042) | -0.032 (0.063) | -0.043 (0.060) | -0.102 (0.088) | -0.031 (0.037) | -0.031 (0.061) | -0.030 (0.054) | -0.036 (0.085) |
| Capital city resident | -0.047** (0.021) | -0.151*** (0.029) | 0.003 (0.027) | -0.035* (0.019) | -0.027 (0.020) | -0.094*** (0.028) | 0.000 (0.040) | -0.023 (0.024) |
| High income | 0.014 (0.022) | 0.013 (0.044) | -0.020 (0.023) | 0.047 (0.039) | 0.006 (0.021) | -0.005 (0.040) | -0.042 (0.029) | 0.064* (0.034) |
| Medium income | 0.009 (0.014) | -0.025 (0.020) | 0.001 (0.024) | 0.048* (0.025) | 0.014 (0.015) | -0.013 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.046* (0.025) |
| Don't know/no answer on income | 0.018 (0.030) | 0.087* (0.052) | -0.052 (0.043) | 0.048 (0.032) | 0.019 (0.028) | 0.061 (0.041) | -0.028 (0.035) | 0.051 (0.037) |
| 2-person household | 0.022 (0.016) | 0.034 (0.029) | 0.014 (0.023) | 0.017 (0.034) | 0.031 (0.020) | 0.059* (0.035) | 0.015 (0.028) | 0.021 (0.041) |
| 3-plus-person household | 0.035** (0.018) | 0.043 (0.028) | 0.018 (0.025) | 0.037 (0.037) | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.026 (0.033) | 0.002 (0.034) | 0.022 (0.035) |
| Country-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Log likelihood | -4,607.0 | -1,653.9 | -1,119.4 | -1,730.3 | -4,848.1 | -1,673.2 | -1,263.6 | -1,810.2 |
| Pseudo-R-squared | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.10 |
| Prob > Chi squared | 1,019.2 | .. | .. | .. | 1,012.4 | .. | .. | .. |
| Number of observations | 8,414 | 2,650 | 2,617 | 3,147 | 8,329 | 2,637 | 2,580 | 3,108 |
| P(DepVar=1) | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.83 | 0.68 | 0.66 | 0.57 | 0.78 | 0.65 |

Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. P(DepVar=1) denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Table A2 continued

Probit estimations: expectations of government-led job creation, subgroup of both beliefs; in CESEE and per country group

| | Expecting jobs to be created primarily by government | | | | Distrusting government but expecting jobs to be created primarily by government | | | |
|---|--|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS |
| | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
| Experienced wage cuts (2008-2018) | -0.007 (0.024) | -0.034 (0.042) | 0.025 (0.041) | -0.011 (0.042) | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.044* (0.025) | 0.017 (0.037) | 0.011 (0.034) |
| Had to cut back on consumption (2008-2018) | -0.014 (0.019) | 0.003 (0.027) | -0.021 (0.036) | -0.019 (0.026) | 0.037*** (0.014) | 0.033** (0.016) | 0.034 (0.027) | 0.047* (0.026) |
| Public welfare benefits are currently important | 0.057*** (0.02) | 0.03 (0.034) | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.093*** (0.033) | -0.012 (0.015) | -0.030* (0.017) | 0.004 (0.026) | -0.001 (0.025) |
| Received unemployment benefits (2008-2018) | -0.011 (0.023) | -0.008 (0.044) | -0.003 (0.04) | -0.037 (0.038) | -0.036** (0.018) | -0.024 (0.027) | -0.026 (0.033) | -0.027 (0.031) |
| Public sector work experience (2008-2018) | 0.050** (0.025) | 0.100*** (0.035) | 0.058* (0.034) | 0.004 (0.037) | 0.025 (0.016) | 0.031** (0.015) | 0.016 (0.031) | 0.029 (0.030) |
| Would vote for a ruling party | 0.012 (0.017) | 0.017 (0.033) | -0.014 (0.029) | 0.001 (0.031) | -0.134*** (0.018) | -0.131*** (0.024) | -0.098*** (0.022) | -0.162*** (0.040) |
| Would not vote | 0.028 (0.02) | 0.059 (0.037) | 0.056** (0.024) | -0.002 (0.036) | 0.017 (0.020) | 0.033 (0.028) | 0.071*** (0.022) | -0.027 (0.045) |
| Don't know for whom to vote | 0.031 (0.027) | -0.047 (0.033) | 0.091** (0.042) | 0.024 (0.057) | -0.021 (0.026) | -0.058* (0.030) | 0.041 (0.030) | -0.056 (0.060) |
| Refused to reveal voting preference | 0.022 (0.027) | -0.094* (0.055) | 0.112*** (0.037) | 0.009 (0.041) | -0.051** (0.026) | -0.051 (0.040) | 0.040 (0.040) | -0.109** (0.045) |
| Aged 19 to 34 years | -0.016 (0.013) | -0.057*** (0.019) | 0.042** (0.018) | -0.035 (0.021) | 0.015 (0.012) | -0.048*** (0.017) | 0.055** (0.024) | 0.033 (0.020) |
| Aged 55+ years | 0.001 (0.016) | -0.01 (0.027) | -0.018 (0.031) | 0.024 (0.027) | -0.004 (0.014) | -0.026 (0.019) | -0.024 (0.025) | 0.036 (0.022) |
| Female | 0.007 (0.012) | -0.003 (0.02) | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.012 (0.023) | -0.005 (0.010) | -0.019 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.019) | -0.000 (0.019) |
| Education attainment: high | -0.071** (0.033) | -0.116*** (0.04) | -0.123* (0.066) | -0.027 (0.048) | -0.030 (0.021) | -0.025 (0.036) | -0.028 (0.040) | -0.047 (0.034) |
| Education attainment: medium | -0.044** (0.02) | -0.051* (0.029) | -0.093** (0.04) | -0.011 (0.03) | -0.011 (0.016) | -0.009 (0.029) | -0.025 (0.030) | 0.003 (0.022) |
| Self-employed | -0.052* (0.027) | -0.06 (0.044) | 0.033 (0.038) | -0.089** (0.043) | -0.035* (0.019) | -0.006 (0.025) | -0.035 (0.031) | -0.065* (0.035) |
| Unemployed | 0.028 (0.022) | 0.080* (0.048) | -0.016 (0.041) | 0.034 (0.029) | 0.005 (0.017) | 0.066** (0.027) | -0.037 (0.034) | 0.007 (0.027) |
| Retired | 0.01 (0.023) | 0.028 (0.04) | 0.024 (0.04) | -0.007 (0.038) | 0.009 (0.021) | 0.045 (0.028) | 0.007 (0.035) | -0.016 (0.034) |
| Student | -0.045* (0.027) | -0.086 (0.057) | -0.035 (0.043) | -0.02 (0.045) | -0.039 (0.024) | -0.006 (0.043) | -0.038 (0.040) | -0.056 (0.041) |
| Muslim | 0.064 (0.054) | -0.018 (0.245) | 0.005 (0.072) | 0.098 (0.082) | 0.073* (0.042) | 0.000 (.) | 0.016 (0.049) | -0.173** (0.078) |
| Orthodox Christian | -0.018 (0.047) | 0.042 (0.089) | -0.008 (0.063) | -0.028 (0.081) | 0.023 (0.031) | 0.001 (0.042) | 0.064* (0.036) | -0.236*** (0.088) |
| Catholic Christian | 0.099** (0.038) | 0.078 (0.05) | 0.135** (0.067) | 0.159 (0.115) | 0.029 (0.021) | 0.024 (0.020) | 0.135*** (0.028) | -0.321*** (0.080) |

Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. P(DepVar=1) denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Table A2 continued

Probit estimations: expectations of government-led job creation, subgroup of both beliefs; in CESEE and per country group

| | Expecting jobs to be created primarily by government | | | | Distrusting government but expecting jobs to be created primarily by government | | | |
|--|--|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS | CESEE | CZ/HU/PL | BG/HR/RO | AL/BA/MK/RS |
| | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
| Other Christian faith (e.g. Protestant) | -0.018 (0.069) | 0.036 (0.069) | 0.12 (0.153) | -0.388*** (0.076) | -0.027 (0.039) | -0.023 (0.032) | 0.155 (0.132) | -0.410*** (0.084) |
| Other faith groups (e.g. Jewish, Buddhist) | 0.124 (0.092) | 0.005 (0.104) | -0.03 (0.114) | 0.372*** (0.097) | 0.119 (0.103) | -0.075 (0.060) | -0.013 (0.074) | 0.343*** (0.072) |
| Religion: no answer | 0.03 (0.044) | 0.025 (0.052) | 0.001 (0.106) | 0.129 (0.14) | 0.013 (0.036) | -0.021 (0.031) | -0.012 (0.049) | 0.027 (0.151) |
| Very interested in politics | -0.044*** (0.017) | -0.05 (0.034) | -0.003 (0.026) | -0.058*** (0.022) | -0.026** (0.012) | 0.012 (0.021) | -0.029 (0.021) | -0.049*** (0.017) |
| Satisfied with life as it is | -0.008 (0.02) | -0.009 (0.034) | -0.056** (0.025) | 0.019 (0.03) | -0.082*** (0.012) | -0.065*** (0.015) | -0.088*** (0.022) | -0.088*** (0.021) |
| House in better condition than that of neighbors | 0.011 (0.02) | -0.035 (0.035) | 0.089*** (0.025) | -0.006 (0.029) | 0.030** (0.013) | 0.010 (0.022) | 0.069*** (0.024) | 0.013 (0.020) |
| House in poorer condition than that of neighbors | -0.018 (0.022) | -0.009 (0.03) | 0.041 (0.052) | -0.049* (0.029) | 0.010 (0.016) | -0.021 (0.018) | 0.022 (0.038) | 0.022 (0.024) |
| Has secondary residence or other real estate | -0.039** (0.019) | -0.055* (0.031) | -0.026 (0.023) | -0.047 (0.035) | -0.028** (0.012) | -0.065*** (0.024) | -0.016 (0.020) | -0.020 (0.018) |
| Respondent reports savings | -0.059*** (0.017) | -0.062** (0.031) | -0.017 (0.021) | -0.067** (0.028) | -0.016 (0.012) | -0.033 (0.020) | -0.011 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.022) |
| Don't know/no answer on savings | -0.014 (0.043) | 0.092 (0.079) | -0.016 (0.058) | -0.131** (0.058) | -0.024 (0.035) | -0.001 (0.049) | 0.003 (0.075) | -0.106*** (0.032) |
| Capital city resident | -0.085* (0.046) | 0.044 (0.037) | -0.04 (0.031) | -0.183*** (0.055) | -0.050** (0.024) | -0.041** (0.018) | 0.009 (0.023) | -0.097** (0.040) |
| High income | -0.070*** (0.024) | -0.127*** (0.035) | -0.067 (0.041) | -0.026 (0.045) | -0.046*** (0.015) | -0.075*** (0.023) | -0.064* (0.034) | -0.020 (0.019) |
| Medium income | -0.047** (0.022) | -0.086** (0.036) | -0.069* (0.04) | -0.006 (0.037) | -0.023 (0.018) | -0.063*** (0.022) | -0.042 (0.035) | 0.016 (0.027) |
| Don't know/no answer on income | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.070* (0.042) | 0.005 (0.042) | 0.018 (0.04) | 0.028* (0.016) | 0.055*** (0.021) | 0.006 (0.032) | 0.024 (0.024) |
| 2-person household | 0.005 (0.02) | 0.058* (0.031) | -0.049** (0.024) | 0.031 (0.042) | 0.009 (0.018) | 0.035 (0.023) | -0.010 (0.029) | 0.013 (0.037) |
| 3-plus-person household | 0.012 (0.024) | 0.107*** (0.029) | -0.054* (0.029) | 0.004 (0.046) | 0.002 (0.018) | 0.029 (0.020) | -0.025 (0.031) | 0.013 (0.033) |
| Country-fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Log likelihood | -5,574.1 | -1,669.2 | -1,623.0 | -2,151.1 | -3,949.5 | -950.1 | -1,348.0 | -1,534.7 |
| Pseudo-R-squared | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.14 |
| Prob > Chi squared | 749.7 | .. | .. | .. | 2,373.3 | .. | .. | .. |
| Number of observations | 8,804 | 2,674 | 2,703 | 3,427 | 8,706 | 2,636 | 2,676 | 3,390 |
| P(DepVar=1) | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.56 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.22 |


Source: Authors' calculations. OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Average marginal effects from probit estimations with country-fixed effects using data from the OeNB Euro Survey 2018; standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that the average marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For a definition of the variables, see annex table A1. P(DepVar=1) denotes the unconditional sample probability of the respective dependent variable. By construction, a positive (negative) average marginal effect implies that a respondent is more (less) likely to agree with the question underlying the dependent variable. Base categories are: preference for the opposition party, 35 to 54 years old, male, low educational attainment, employed, atheist/agnostic, main residence in a similar condition as neighboring homes, no savings, no secondary residence, not living in the capital city, low income, single household, Czech resident. The CESEE group comprises all ten OeNB Euro Survey countries. The second group consists of three Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004. The third country group consists of three Southeastern European countries that became EU members in 2007 and 2013, respectively. The final group consists of four EU candidates or potential candidates.

Detailed country-specific responses to the main survey questions of interest

Chart A1

Who should be responsible for the following tasks? Job creation




Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2018.

Note: Weighted percentages; weights are calibrated on census population statistics for age, gender, region and, where available, on education and ethnicity (separately for each country). Entries for CESEE are unconditional averages across all observations using individual weights not adjusted for population size.

Chart A2

Trust in government



Source: OeNB Euro Survey.

Note: Respondents were asked to express their trust in government on a scale from 1 (I trust completely) to 5 (I don't trust at all). The weighted values represent the share of respondents who picked "somewhat trust" or "trust completely." Excluding respondents with "don't know" answers or no answers. Weights are calibrated on census population statistics for age, gender, region, and, where available, education and ethnicity (separately for each country).